Financial Inclusion: Concepts, Issues and Policies for India by Singh, Nirvikar
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Financial Inclusion: Concepts, Issues and
Policies for India
Nirvikar Singh
University of California, Santa Cruz
December 2018
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/91047/
MPRA Paper No. 91047, posted 1 January 2019 22:24 UTC
  
Financial Inclusion: Concepts, Issues and Policies for India* 
Nirvikar Singh 
Department of Economics 
University of California, Santa Cruz 
Revised, December 2018 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper lays out some of the basic concepts surrounding financial inclusion, including access 
to banking, digital payments and financial literacy, as well as markets for health insurance, crop 
insurance, agricultural credit, small firm finance, and microcredit/ microfinance. It goes on to 
discuss various empirical and institutional studies of these dimensions of financial inclusion in 
the context of developing countries. The paper then outlines several recent studies for India 
which pertain to these specific aspects of financial inclusion. Finally, the paper draws lessons for 
policy-making and future research directions. Important considerations that emerge from the 
overview are the significance of social and economic context, the need to consider behavioral 
biases connected to situations involving time and risk, the interaction of different dimensions of 
financial inclusion, the importance of details of policy design, and the limited understanding we 
still have of many of the factors underlying the functioning of financial markets. 
Keywords: financial inclusion, saving, insurance, credit, microfinance, financial literacy, India 
JEL Codes: G21, G22, G38, G41, O16
                                                 
* This is a revised and abbreviated version of an International Growth Centre synthesis paper with the same title, 
written in 2017: the topic seems very relevant for a volume that honors an economist, Pranab Bardhan, who has 
written extensively on aspects of inclusive development, namely, development which focuses on improving the lives 
of the poor. I am grateful to Eilin Francis and Arshad Mirza for valuable research assistance, and to Dilip 
Mookherjee for incisive comments on an earlier draft. Sole responsibility for shortcomings is mine. 
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Introduction 
Financial development is an obvious component of overall economic development, as well as 
helping to spur growth.1 Studying the role of financial development in economic growth has 
gone from measuring it in terms of a single number such as the ratio of bank credit to an overall 
measure of economic activity (typically GDP) to considering the different dimensions of the 
concept. A typical decomposition of the concept of financial development considers depth, 
access, efficiency and stability (Cihak et al., 2012).2 Financial depth corresponds to the 
dimension captured in measures such as credit-GDP ratios. Financial access is essentially the 
same as financial inclusion, and the latter term has become more common (World Bank, 2014). 
The 2014 World Bank conceptualization of financial inclusion parallels basic ideas of financial 
depth: “the proportion of individuals and firms that use financial services” (p. 1). Subsequently, 
the Bank has developed a more elaborate definition: 
Financial inclusion means that individuals and businesses have access to useful and 
affordable financial products and services that meet their needs – transactions, payments, 
savings, credit and insurance – delivered in a responsible and sustainable way. 
(http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/financialinclusion/overview#1) 
This definition highlights the different aspects of financial services that are ultimately what make 
finance an important part of the economy. As the web site notes, “Access to a transaction 
account is a first step toward broader financial inclusion since it allows people to store money, 
and send and receive payments. A transaction account can also serve as a gateway to other 
financial services…” There are several implicit assumptions in highlighting financial inclusion in 
this manner, in particular, the notion that the aforementioned financial services are not available 
to a set of people that is socially optimal, either in an instrumental sense of maximizing 
aggregate welfare (including social concerns for reducing inequality) and economic growth, or in 
                                                 
1 Recent contributions to the enormous literature on the connection between financial development and growth 
include Beck et al., (2007), Law and Singh (2014), Aizenman et al., (2015) and Arcand et al. (2015). 
2 Sahay et al. (2015) consider depth, access and efficiency as components of financial development, and consider 
financial and economic stability separately. These analyses also distinguish between financial markets and financial 
institutions. Cihak et al. (2012), following earlier work on constructing indices of financial development, discuss 
various measures of access, including bank accounts per 1,000 individuals and percentage of firms with lines of 
credit (institutions), as well as percentage of market capitalization outside the 10 largest companies (markets). Sahay 
et al. (2015) use similar measures. 
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a broader sense of promoting rights and capabilities for all human beings (Sen, 1999). Possible 
reasons for suboptimality are taken up later in this paper. 
The World Bank web site on financial inclusion goes on to remind readers of the beneficial 
ripple effects of financial access, beginning with basic formal transaction accounts. These 
benefits include lower transaction costs for daily economic activities, the ability to plan for 
longer-term needs, and the opportunity to create buffers for unexpected emergencies. For the 
better-off in both advanced and developing countries, both financial access and its benefits are 
taken relatively for granted, although the limits and challenges of access are much more severe in 
poorer economies or regions.3  
Other discussions of financial inclusion have different emphases, but with similar scope. For 
example, the introduction to a collection (Cull et al., 2012) of empirical analyses of financial 
inclusion begins by highlighting microcredit as being symbolic of growing financial inclusion, 
though it goes on to note savings, transfers and insurance as other important services. While 
many such financial services are missing or barely provided in poorer countries such as India, the 
challenge of providing microcredit is just one example of pervasive credit market imperfections 
that hamper development. These imperfections are apparent in the very limited access of most 
individuals in, say, India to formal credit markets, and the large disparities in borrowing costs 
between formal and informal credit markets.4 
Cull et al. (2012) also note the importance of technological and product innovation in improving 
inclusion. Karmakar et al. (2011), in assessing financial inclusion in India, begin by emphasizing 
the need to expand the reach of formal financial institutions such as banks, as a channel for 
access to a range of financial services. The role of technological innovation in reducing costs of 
service provision is highlighted, as is the need for financial counseling: indeed, behavioral and 
other demand side aspects of financial inclusion deserve as much attention as technological and 
supply side approaches. 
Karlan and Morduch (2009) provided a major survey of “Access to Finance,” which still 
represents the most comprehensive academic review of the topic. They pointed out that research 
in the area had already gone well beyond the initial focus on microcredit for investment by small 
entrepreneurs. The authors discuss new credit mechanisms and devices that help households 
manage cash flows, save, and cope with risk. In this context, they consider issues of contract 
design, product innovation, regulatory policy, and bottom-line economic and social impacts. The 
survey also relates the empirical evidence to theoretical concepts rooted in behavioral economics 
and to the use of randomized evaluation methods. Such randomized trials are highlighted as 
particularly important in the testing of potential innovations in financial products and services, 
                                                 
3 The discussion of the benefits of financial inclusion ties in with the detailed micro-level account of the lives of 
poor people in Banerjee and Duflo (2011). For one example of Pranab Bardhan’s many contributions to the topic of 
improving the lives of the poor, see Bardhan (2007). 
4 Dilip Mookherjee (personal communication, February 2017) has emphasized the benefits of financial inclusion for 
better targeting of government welfare programs, and also control of corruption by intermediaries. For example, 
Muralidharan et al. (2016) evaluate the impact of biometric payments infrastructure to make social welfare 
payments in Andhra Pradesh, and find large reductions in leakage of funds. 
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and in the institutional and technological contexts in which they are delivered. Karlan and 
Morduch ultimately emphasize the importance of attention to detail in finding workable solutions 
to lack of financial access, a natural conclusion when trying to reach marginal populations that 
are not natural sources of profit for sellers of financial products and services. 
Aggarwal and Klapper (2013) build on Karlan and Morduch, and organize their discussion 
around various barriers to financial inclusion, as well as policies to overcome these. Among the 
barriers they highlight are time and financial costs of opening and maintaining bank accounts, as 
well as the cost of meeting documentation requirements (which may be effectively infinite if the 
required documentation is not possible). They discuss ways of reducing these costs, which can 
include regulatory policy changes, acceleration of adoption of digital technology-based 
mechanisms, institutional innovations such as the use of bank agents, or, typically, some mix of 
all three of these approaches. 
A still more recent, though relatively brief, survey is that of Karlan et al. (2016). Echoing themes 
in the two earlier surveys, the authors emphasize the challenges of market imperfections and 
deviations from fully rational behavior for efforts to increase financial access. Yet, they draw 
optimistic conclusions from empirical studies about the potential of digital technologies and of 
savings products to provide measurable benefits, though noting that areas such as microcredit 
and insurance present greater difficulties for successful innovation. 
The current paper does not substitute for or supersede these surveys, but builds on them. The rest 
of this paper is organized in terms of aspects of financial inclusion, or behavior pertinent to it. 
These nine sections cover financial inclusion in general, banking, microcredit and microfinance, 
small firm finance, agricultural credit, farmers’ insurance, health insurance, financial literacy and 
behavioral factors. Each section discusses research from a variety of developing countries, 
including India, though it is cannot be exhaustive given the size of the literature. The final 
section concludes by summarizing what we know and perhaps do not know, with the latter being 
a guide to possible future research and analysis. A key theme of the paper, in line with previous 
surveys, is that succeeding in the various goals associated with promoting financial inclusion 
requires careful attention to detail with respect to institutions, markets and human behavior, and 
this in turn requires targeted and well-designed research. The focus on India allows for some 
potentially more targeted policy recommendations, as well as specific research directions. 
 
Financial Inclusion Overall 
Several cross-country analyses of financial inclusion are available. Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper 
(2013) summarize a public data set that measures the financial behavior of adults in 148 
countries.5 They use it to benchmark financial inclusion, and document the most important 
barriers to bank use, such as the cost of opening account and the need for documentation of 
identity, residence and so on. Sarma and Pais (2011) analyze cross section data from several 
dozen countries, and find that levels of human development and financial inclusion are positively 
                                                 
5 Their paper is based on the Global Findex Database: see http://datatopics.worldbank.org/financialinclusion/. 
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correlated. More specifically, lower income inequality, higher literacy levels and better physical 
and communication infrastructure are all associated with greater financial inclusion. Cull et al. 
(2012) includes several overviews of the state of global knowledge of financial inclusion, with 
data that shows that many of the poor do use formal financial services, suggesting a scope for 
greater inclusion: poverty by itself need not be an insurmountable barrier.  
Karmakar et al. (2011) provide a comprehensive account of the challenges of financial inclusion 
in India. They identify institutional and resource constraints, and discuss targeting efforts that 
have focused on rural populations, women’s groups, tribal areas, or combinations of these. They 
consider the different dimensions of financial services, including transactions, savings, credit and 
insurance, and possible institutional and technological innovations, including digital tools for 
identification, payments, and storage. The analysis provides a detailed account of many past and 
current policy initiatives that intersect with various dimensions of financial inclusion, on both the 
demand and supply sides. It conveys a broad sense of the challenges encountered in 
policymaking and implementation, but provides no engagement with the empirical academic 
literature on financial inclusion, so the policy recommendations lack a firm basis. 
Also for India, Badarinza et al. (2017) use a major household survey to provide a cross-sectional 
picture of both the asset and liability sides of household balance sheets.6 They document that, in 
India, lower proportions of younger households hold financial assets, even compared to China, 
let alone developed countries. Other striking features of the financial landscape are that 
households do not reduce real estate holdings as they cross retirement age, there is no drop off in 
mortgage loan participation at these ages, and unsecured debt is more significant in all age 
groups. Similar differences are reflected in comparisons across the wealth distribution. Savings 
in retirement account are nearly absent. The authors document a high reliance on gold as a form 
of savings, lack of access to bank branches as a constraint to financial savings, striking regional 
variations, and the importance of education in supporting higher use of financial savings. 
Campbell et al. (2012) analyze India’s mortgage market. As indicated from the household 
survey, Indians’ use of mortgages for housing is quite limited. Campbell et al. focus on the 
impacts of mortgage market regulation, yielding a useful case study of the impacts of national-
level policymaking on financial inclusion. They analyze administrative data on over one million 
loans originated by an Indian mortgage provider, examining loan pricing and default rates. The 
period was one in which the availability of mortgages was increasing fairly rapidly, but so was 
regulation of the market. Lending to small borrowers is an important aspect of financial inclusion 
in the context of the housing market, and the data indicate that regulatory changes designed to 
promote this goal were successful. However, there was a spike in defaults, suggesting the 
possible costs of policies that neglect the capacity and incentives of market participants. On the 
positive side, the data imply that mortgage lenders were able to learn from the experience of 
surging defaults, and priced risks more accurately in subsequent years. The lessons of this study 
are potentially generalizable. Policies designed to support goals of financial inclusion require 
careful attention to market structure, incentives of market participants, and learning and 
                                                 
6 The data is from the 2012 All India Debt and Investment Survey (AIDIS), conducted by the NSSO, with over 
100,000 households sampled. 
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adjustment through ongoing analysis of market data. Private profit-making entities have 
incentives to engage in the latter, but their behavior ought not to be overly distorted by the 
regulatory structure: regulations have to balance risks and efficiency against equity-enhancing 
goals of financial inclusion.  
 
Banking 
Among aspects of financial inclusion, we begin with banking, in keeping with the observation 
that access to a transaction account can serve as a foundation or gateway for broader financial 
access. One can conceptualize banking to include institutional variations such as post office 
accounts, and technology-enabled innovations such as agent banking. Two studies from India 
provide evidence that targeting bank access can have positive impacts. Burgess and Pande (2005) 
examine the social banking program introduced after India’s bank nationalization in 1969. Using 
panel data for 16 states over 1961 - 2000, with information about the number of bank branches, 
rural credit and saving shares, and poverty and wage estimates, the authors show that branch 
expansion was associated with reductions in rural poverty. In a related analysis, Burgess, Wong 
and Pande (2005) found that national policy that caused banks to open relatively more branches 
in less financially-developed states and expand into rural unbanked locations reduced poverty 
across Indian states. They also argued that enforcement of directed bank lending increased bank 
borrowing among the poor, in particular, for low-caste and tribal groups.  
The Burgess-Pande findings were tempered by a subsequent analysis of a similar period: Kochar 
(2011) used district-level data for India’s largest state, Uttar Pradesh, and took account of 
potentially confounding correlations of two sources of credit expansion at that time. She found 
evidence of increasing inequality, with the non-poor benefiting more from bank branch 
expansion than did the poor.7 Using later data, Young (2015) highlighted several positive 
impacts of expanding bank access on economic activity, using a well-structured causal analysis, 
thus providing strong evidence of the benefits of bank expansion in India. 
In a more micro-level study, Somville and Vandewalle (2015) conducted a field experiment in 
rural India to study the effect on savings of identical weekly payments on a bank account 
(treatment group) or in cash (control group). They found a large and persistent treatment effect, 
with savings increasing by over 100 percent within three months. Villagers given cash, on the 
other hand, did not save more in other assets, but increased consumption, suggesting that having 
a bank account can have a net positive impact on total savings. However, Prina (2015) found 
more limited effects of having bank accounts for female household heads in Nepal. They were 
given access to bank accounts with no fees. Impacts on income, aggregate expenditures, and 
assets were too imprecisely estimated for definite conclusions, although there was evidence of a 
higher ability of households to cope with shocks. Finally, Dupas et al. (2016) experimentally 
                                                 
7 In contrast, a cross-country study by Anson et al. (2013) suggests that post office savings schemes tend to be of 
greater benefit to the relatively poor, even though post offices may not have full bank status, as is the case in India. 
Post office savings accounts in India can also be used to make government welfare payments, as was discussed in 
the introduction.  
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tested the impact of expanding access to basic bank accounts in three countries (Uganda, 
Malawi, and Chile). While the number of deposits increased, survey data showed no clearly 
discernible effects on savings or any downstream outcomes.  
Such studies suggest that policies merely focused on expanding access to basic accounts are not 
guaranteed to improve outcomes, and that there are other factors that influence success and 
failure, and which need to be identified. Despite mixed evidence, research suggests that there are 
mechanisms that can bring down the cost of access to formal banking for poor households, and 
thereby improve their savings strategies. In India, there has been a massive, nationwide effort to 
achieve banking access for vast numbers of the country’s poorer citizens – the Jan Dhan part of 
JAM (standing for Jan Dhan (banking), Aadhaar (identity) and Mobile (transactions), discussed 
more later in the context of digital payments). While technology is an important part of 
facilitating access and maintenance of bank accounts, making these accounts more useful to 
small account holders is important for long-run sustainability.8 Bank operations and everyday 
practices in India have the potential for improvement (see Singh, 2015 for a brief discussion of 
credit risk management in Indian banks).   
Cole et al. (2015) tackle the issue of bank operations through an experiment with commercial 
bank loan officers in India. This was a high-stakes field experiment, providing the subjects with 
tangible incentives, permitting a “clean” test of how performance compensation affects risk-
assessment and lending in a banking environment. The loan officers in the study were paid to 
review and assess over 14,000 actual (but previously processed) loan applications. They were 
provided with different kinds of exogenous incentive schemes, and, while the subjects did not 
know how the loans had performed, this information was available to the researchers. The results 
indicated that high-powered incentives do lead to greater screening effort, separating “good” 
from “bad” borrowers, and to more profitable lending decisions. However, typical features of 
loan officer compensation contracts such as deferred compensation and limited liability, toned 
down the incentive effects. Career concerns and some personality traits also affected loan officer 
behavior, but the impact of incentive schemes did not vary with personality traits such as risk-
aversion, optimism or overconfidence. Performance incentives are important across all kinds of 
organizations, but areas such as bank lending are particularly important in the context of India’s 
financial inclusion goals. Expanding banking without improving the performance of bank 
employees, particularly those who make lending decisions that can lead to productive investment 
and job creation, can be a significantly suboptimal strategy. 
A different approach to improving the performance of conventional banks is the creation of 
alternative kinds of banking institutions. Rural cooperative banks have a long history in India, 
but have been subject to political capture. Another alternative is the model represented by India’s 
Shri Mahil Self Employment Women Association Sahkari (SEWA) Bank, the oldest women’s 
bank in the world. Targeting women represents a vital aspect of financial inclusion since women 
at any income level (but especially poorer ones) are less likely to have financial autonomy and 
                                                 
8 Indeed, in India access to bank accounts is perhaps easier than in many other developing countries, because of the 
creation or existence of no-frills type accounts and post office accounts. Arguably, therefore, this aspect of financial 
inclusion in India has moved beyond access to basic accounts to access to useful services and products. 
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access to financial services than their male counterparts. Field et al. (2016) use data on the 
expansion of the SEWA Bank to examine the impact of access to microfinance on women’s 
labor force participation. This data pertains to urban settings, so the distance or scarcity aspects 
of constraints to financial access are not salient. Beginning in 1999, SEWA Bank began a major 
expansion of the number of loan collection officers they employed. This significantly reduced 
the transaction cost of getting a loan in Ahmedabad, Gujarat’s capital and largest city, and 
thereby increased access for many women to microloans. The results indicate that access to such 
loans helped integrate women into the labor force over a period of several years. This effect was 
driven by greater participation of women in household business activity, although not necessarily 
a sustainable change in female empowerment, since the share of household income produced by 
women increased but with a diminishing effect over time. An intriguing effect in the data was a 
reduction in fertility associated with increasing participation in the labor force. This analysis 
hints at the importance of financial inclusion for a range of social and economic outcomes 
pertaining to the status and welfare of women in India. 
 
Microcredit/ Microfinance 
Microfinance and microcredit have received disproportionate attention as vehicles for providing 
needed access to funds for the poor. Key ideas behind these efforts include pooling of funds, risk 
sharing and joint monitoring and liability. Target populations, even if they have bank accounts, 
would almost certainly not qualify for traditional bank loans. Many might use “informal” 
financial services of moneylenders, with the potential of being trapped in unsustainable debt 
situations. Of course, it is now recognized that microfinance is not a magic bullet for providing 
access to credit for the poor, but an enormous body of empirical research provides an 
understanding of how the institution works in different contexts. 
Several meta-analyses are now available. Ahlin, et al. (2011) collected data on 373 MFIs and 
merged it with country-level economic and institutional data to provide evidence for 
complementarity between MFI performance and that of the broader economy. Van Rooyen, et al. 
(2012) systematically reviewed the evidence of the impacts of micro-credit and micro-savings on 
poor people in sub-Saharan Africa. They considered impacts on income, savings, expenditure, 
and the accumulation of assets, as well as a range of non-financial outcomes including health, 
food security, and education, and concluded that microfinance has mixed impacts on the 
livelihoods of the poor. 
Many recent studies of microfinance have used randomized controlled trials (RCTs). Banerjee, 
Karlan and Zinman (2015), provide an introduction and review for six randomized evaluations of 
microcredit and conclude that there is a “consistent pattern of modestly positive, but not 
transformative, effects.” One study in this collection (Banerjee et al., 2015) reports on an RCT 
conducted in Hyderabad, using random selection of areas for opening of a branch of a 
microfinance institution (Spandana). In the treatment areas, households were more likely to have 
a microcredit loan, but there were no significant improvements in health, education, and 
women’s empowerment. Households with access to credit were not more likely to start new 
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business, but they did invest more in their existing businesses. Other studies have been able to 
analyze large-scale government initiatives, such as the Thai Million Baht Village MFI program. 
Kaboski and Townsend (2011, 2012) used pre- and post-program panel data and quasi-
experimental cross-village variation in credit per household, and found that village MFI funds 
increased total short-term credit, consumption, agricultural investment, and income, but perhaps 
decreased overall asset growth.  
Two recent studies for India analyze the impacts of certain contractual features in microcredit. 
Field et al. (2013) conducted an RCT that compared a standard microcredit contract, requiring 
repayment to begin immediately after the disbursement of the loan, to an alternative contractual 
setup that included a two-month grace period. The study found that providing a grace period 
increased short-run business investment as well as long-run profits but doing so also raised 
default rates. These results suggest that microcredit contracts that require early repayment 
discourage illiquid risky investment. There are costs to relaxing this constraint because of higher 
default rates (associated with greater adverse selection as well as moral hazard) , but the net 
welfare impacts of subsidizing microfinance institutions to be able to withstand higher default 
rates might be positive, because of higher microenterprise growth and greater reductions in 
household poverty.  
Another study (Barboni, 2016) also tackles the issue of contractual design in microfinance, 
focusing as well on repayment flexibility. A model of adverse selection predicts that lenders can 
achieve higher profits by offering a menu of choices which include rigid and flexible repayment 
schedules, instead of just the standard rigid contract. A set of in-the-field experimental games 
conducted with Indian micro-entrepreneurs showed that more entrepreneurial borrowers were 
more likely than less entrepreneurial ones to take-up the flexible contract. This separation was 
even more pronounced when the flexible schedule was costlier relative to the rigid contract.  
Studies have also been done to check the robustness of earlier claims. In particular, Roodman 
and Morduch (2009) replicate and reanalyze an influential study of microcredit impacts on poor 
households in Bangladesh. That study was celebrated for showing that microcredit reduces 
poverty, but the re-analysis shows that the original results on poverty reduction disappeared after 
dropping outliers, or when using an estimation method robust to such outliers. Hence, even in 
microfinance, an area of financial inclusion where significant research has been carried out, there 
is much more to be learned about the factors that influence the success of such efforts. 
 
Small Firm Finance 
Research on microfinance overlaps with analyses of small firm finance, since the latter can 
include micro-entrepreneurs. Studies examine information constraints as well as credit 
constraints. De Mel et al. (2011) examined the role of information through an RCT in Sri Lanka. 
The intervention was designed to improve access to credit among high-return microenterprises 
by providing information about the microfinance loan product, along with a reduction in the 
number of personal guarantors required for these loans, but without subsidizing interest rates or 
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requiring group lending. The outcomes suggest that information alone is unlikely to be enough to 
efficiently improve access. Dupas and Robinson (2013) used an RCT to identify significant 
barriers to savings and investment in rural Kenya among the self-employed. Randomly selected 
individuals were given free access to non-interest-bearing bank accounts among two types of 
self-employed: female market vendors and men working as bicycle taxi drivers. Despite large 
withdrawal fees, a substantial share of market women used the accounts, were able to save more, 
and increased their productive investment and private expenditures. But, for the men, there was 
no effect.9 Karlan et al. (2015) experimented with providing consulting and financial capital to 
microenterprise tailors in Ghana. These infusions changed investment and business practices, but 
did not lead to significant changes in profit and were not sustained in the long run.10 
A large literature examines financing constraints for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) more 
generally, particularly in developing countries. Beck (2007) surveys empirical research along 
these lines, showing that SMEs are more constrained by financing and other institutional 
obstacles than are large firms, with this situation being made worse by weaknesses in the 
financial systems of many developing countries. For example, Beck and Demirguc-Kunt (2006) 
use cross-country panel data, and find that financial and institutional development affect SMEs’ 
growth, and that SMEs are credit constrained, so that greater access to external finance can level 
the playing field between firms of different sizes. Another cross-country study, Love and Pería 
(2015), finds that greater bank competition improves firms' access to finance. 
Country-specific studies of small firm financing constraints find similar types of results. 
Banerjee and Duflo (2008) use data from a directed lending program in India to show that firms 
there are credit constrained. De and Singh (2014) combine panel data of reported financial 
information for a sample of SMEs in India with data from a survey of the same firms, regarding 
the role of relationships in supply of inter-firm credit. They find that firms that are unsuccessful 
in generating internal funds or bank loans have better access to relationship-based credit, but the 
latter is also rationed. In a similar vein, Ayyagari et al. (2010) find that Chinese private sector 
firms that have access to formal finance grow faster while firms that rely on informal finance do 
not. 
To put this issue in context for India, there is considerable evidence that, while liberalization and 
economic reform beginning in 1991 led to new entry of firms, more recently, industrial 
dynamism has stalled (Alfaro and Chari, 2009, 2014). There are a variety of factors constraining 
growth of smaller firms, but finance is certainly one of them (Allen et al., 2007; Shukla, 2015). 
These earlier studies did not, however, establish clear causal linkages. 
A study by Raj and Sen (2013) fills the gap, analyzing very small family firms – the predominant 
type of firm in the informal sector in India – and the role of finance constraints in preventing 
them from transitioning to larger firms that employ non-family labor. The authors use unit level 
data drawn from national surveys of informal manufacturing by the NSSO. They supplement this 
with panel data analysis of 364 districts, estimating the effects of financial development on firm 
                                                 
9 Hence, this analysis also connects with studies of banking access, discussed earlier. 
10 See also Cull et al. (2011, 2016). 
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transition at the district level. They present strong evidence that finance constraints play an 
important role in firm transition from family-labor-only firms to small firms that use hired labor, 
but even more so for the growth of the latter beyond six workers. Firm capabilities matter as 
well: for example, firms that maintain formal accounts are more likely to make the transition 
than firms that do not. Other factors that affect transition and growth include working as sub-
contractors, having access to electricity, being located in an urban area, and being in a district 
with higher levels of human capital. An important result is that government assistance, such as 
loans, training, and marketing, does not help firms transition and grow, suggesting that policy 
may be more effective in focusing on relaxing financing and other constraints for small, informal 
sector firms. 
 
Agricultural Credit 
The importance of food production and the size of the agricultural sector in many developing 
countries make agricultural credit politically and economically more salient than credit for other 
kinds of products and services. India is an important illustration of these statements, with loans 
to farmers and forgiveness of those loans being tied to electoral considerations (e.g., Cole, 2009). 
On the other hand, there is also evidence that small and marginal farmers still depend on 
informal lenders, and this can contribute to agrarian distress in some cases (e.g., Singh, 2012; 
Gill, 2016). 
Micro-studies of loans to farmers suggest that there are inefficiencies in the allocation and use of 
agricultural credit. A study of 300 farmers in Nigeria (Oboh and Ekpebu, 2011) finds delays in 
disbursing bank loans as well as considerable diversion of loans to non-farm purposes. Rahman 
(2011) finds that farm credit in Bangladesh may be inefficiently and insufficiently allocated, 
especially in the context of a positive correlation between the credit and output. Studies for India 
(e.g., Sharma and Kumawat, 2014) and Pakistan (e.g., Mehmood et al., 2012) also document 
similar situations: loans are made and monitored inefficiently, so even though credit is rationed, 
increasing its supply may not be welfare improving in the absence of institutional improvements 
such as better targeting and monitoring. 
Even when farm loans are subsidized and forgiven, small farmers may still often face substantial 
financial distress. Maitra et al. (2014) explore an alternative approach to credit for small farmers. 
Randomly selected villages in West Bengal state in India participated in a field experiment with 
an innovative variant of microcredit, trader-agent intermediated lending (TRAIL): borrowers of 
individual liability loans in some villages (all small farmers) were selected by local trader-lender 
agents, who received incentives in the form of repayment-based commissions. In other villages, 
small farmers had access to a more conventional group-based lending program (GBL). TRAIL 
loans did much better than GBL loans in increasing production of the leading cash crop and farm 
incomes. The underlying mechanism for this result included the fact that borrowers selected by 
TRAIL agents were more able farmers than those who self-selected into the GBL scheme, 
although this pattern of selection did not completely explain the observed difference in income 
impacts. An implication of this work is that it points out a possibility for leveraging existing 
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institutions or expertise, somewhat similar to how ITC used existing commission agents to 
facilitate its Internet-based e-choupal procurement scheme (Goyal, 2010). 
A study by Mitra et al. (2012) also has some indirect implications for agricultural credit policy 
for small farmers. In much of India, small farmers do not sell directly to large buyers, but rely on 
intermediaries: credit constraints are one factor in this market structure, as are asymmetries of 
information. This study analyzes how potato farmers in West Bengal sell their crop to local 
traders, including how prices and intermediary margins are determined. Small farmers in 
randomly chosen villages were provided information about daily wholesale prices, either 
publicly or privately. The evidence did not support the idea that risk was being shared between 
farmers and traders, but was consistent with small farmers having limited alternatives for selling 
their produce, making price information of little value. More specifically, providing farmers with 
access to market price information to reduce their informational asymmetry vis-à-vis traders did 
not have a significant average impact on farmgate prices, while raising pass-through of 
wholesale market prices to farmgate prices, because of the lack of access of these farmers to 
direct sale in wholesale markets. One possibility is that easing credit constraints for small 
farmers (so that they have to rely less on trade credit from intermediaries) could improve their 
bargaining power and increase the value of price information for farmers. 
 
Farmers’ Insurance 
Insurance for developing country farmers is an important new area of experiments in financial 
inclusion. Weather insurance and crop or livestock insurance may protect small and marginal 
farmers from distress. For example, Nair (2010) used micro data from the Agriculture Insurance 
Company of India, to argue that weather insurance is more market-based and financially 
sustainable than yield-based insurance. Cole et al. (2014) examined the market for rainfall 
insurance purchases by rural farming households in Gujarat. Demand was highly sensitive to 
payouts being made in a household's village in the most recent year, perhaps suggesting a trust 
effect. The observations of Gine (2009) complement some of these results, noting the problem of 
correlation of rainfall and macroeconomic conditions, and the need to make rapid payouts to 
liquidity-constrained farmers, in order for the insurance to be effective.11 
Issues of price sensitivity are explored in the context of livestock insurance in Ethiopia by 
Takahashi et al. (2016). Randomly distributed learning kits improved subjects’ knowledge of the 
products but did not lead to greater insurance uptake. On the other hand, reduced price due to 
randomly distributed discount coupons has an immediate, positive impact on uptake, without 
dampening subsequent period demand. The interaction of credit and insurance is analyzed in 
Karlan et al. (2011), trying to address a key question for development: does risk inhibit 
investment? They conducted an RCT in rural Ghana, and offered the treatment groups loans that 
forgave 50 percent of the loan if crop prices dropped below a threshold price. A control group 
was offered a standard loan product at the same interest rate. Surprisingly, the indemnity 
                                                 
11 See also Gine, Townsend and Vickery (2008) for earlier evidence of the Indian experience. 
12 
 
component had little impact. Binswanger-Mkhize (2012) also expresses pessimism about 
agricultural insurance based on weather indices, pointing out that credit and cash constraints for 
poor farmers make it difficult for them to purchase insurance in advance of the harvest.  
However, Karlan, et al. (2014) provide more positive evidence of the benefits of access to 
agricultural insurance. The authors conducted several experiments in which farmers were 
randomly assigned to receive cash grants, grants of (or opportunities to purchase) rainfall index 
insurance, or a combination of the two. The observed demand for this insurance was strong, and 
insurance led to significantly larger agricultural investment as well as riskier production choices. 
These results indicate that uninsured catastrophic risk can be a binding constraint to farmers’ 
investment. There was also evidence of social network effects and overweighting recent events, 
suggesting that careful design of policies and financial education are both needed in 
implementing such innovations in financial products.12  
Agricultural insurance products for small farmers are challenging to implement: besides being 
income constrained, farmers lack experience with insurance, financial literacy, and general 
education. Gaurav et al. (2011) conducted a field experiment (RCT) involving different methods 
of marketing rainfall insurance to small-scale farmers in Gujarat, India. Financial education had 
a positive effect on rainfall insurance adoption, but only one marketing intervention, a money-
back guarantee, had a consistent and large effect on farmers’ purchase decisions. This suggests 
that farmers do not have the experience to be able to trust the new insurance product, and the 
guarantee mitigates their risk perceptions. While such guarantees are uncommon or absent for 
insurance in mature markets, the use of money-back guarantees for various kinds of products is 
widespread, especially where the product is novel or the seller is not trusted. 
A major research project (Mobarak and Rosenzweig, 2013) examines the interaction between 
informal risk sharing, index insurance and risk-taking using a large-scale RCT. The authors 
randomized offerings of rainfall insurance contracts to cultivating and landless households in a 
set of Indian villages.  Census data on caste networks permitted characterization of the nature 
and extent of informal risk sharing before the contracts were offered. The authors found that: (1) 
informal group-level risk sharing had the potential to make up for weaknesses in weather index 
insurance, and increase the demand for such index insurance; (2) index insurance had the 
potential to do better than informal indemnification in incentivizing farmers to invest in riskier 
technologies with higher average returns; and (3) offering insurance contracts to cultivators 
could lead to increased risk-taking, and to increased risk exposure of agricultural laborers, 
making the latter more likely to purchase weather insurance themselves when aware of this 
possible effect. Such studies can provide important guidance for the design of weather insurance 
at a regional scale, and ultimately for policymakers seeking to achieve widespread adoption of 
such insurance, making it more sustainable. 
 
                                                 
12 A recent review of the evidence on microinsurance (Platteau et al., 2017) identifies price, quality, limited trust in 
the insurer, and liquidity constraints as factors limiting demand, along with lack of understanding of the products. 
See also De Bock and Gelade (2012). 
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Health Insurance 
Health insurance for the poor represents a dimension of financial inclusion that intersects with 
much larger concerns about access to health care. While many industrial countries provide 
universal publicly funded health care, others, most notably the United States, do not, with 
exclusion disproportionately affecting the less well-off. The centrality of health to people’s lives 
also makes it an exceptionally emotive subject. The financial aspect enters health care because of 
its potentially high costs, and developing countries obviously face more stringent constraints. In 
such cases, health insurance programs for the poor are meant to increase access to health care 
when the public delivery system is unable to do so effectively. 
One approach to inclusion is through community-based health insurance schemes: essentially a 
form of mutual insurance. For example, a study for Senegal (Jutting, 2003) suggests that these 
can extend access to health care, although the poorest of the poor are still excluded. A study of 
community-based insurance for China (Wang et al., 2005) finds that the benefits of the insurance 
are skewed toward richer participants, highlighting the difficulties and the importance of proper 
targeting and design. In general, qualitative case studies across countries suggest that micro-
insurance for health care is a complex undertaking with significant challenges (McCord, 2001).13 
India has seen significant recent efforts to develop health insurance programs for the poor, and 
many studies of these efforts. Palacios et al. (2011) is a collection of such studies with a great 
deal of institutional detail, including discussing some of the problems of implementation. A 
study by Nandi et al. (2013) carefully examines the determinants of enrolment in the new health 
insurance schemes.14 Selvaraj and Karan (2012) argue that publicly funded health insurance 
schemes with private provision do not work. They argue against involving the private sector at 
all, their concerns being that private providers will cherry-pick, and that there are high 
administrative and other costs associated with private sector involvement. Ravi and Bergkvist 
(2015) posit a different conclusion: allowing for the length of time of operation of publicly 
financed health insurance schemes (PFHISs) reveals impacts that are more positive than found 
by Selvraj and Karan. However, two other studies of Indian health insurance schemes (Sood et 
al., 2013; Karan et al., 2015) also find little or no impact of these schemes on the health 
expenditure of the poor. Importantly, there are differences between the performance of the 
national health insurance scheme and various state-level schemes, with some of the latter doing 
better (e.g., Rao et al., 2014). 
Implications of health insurance for financial inclusion are brought out in Banerjee et al. (2014). 
In an RCT, SKS the largest MFI in India bundled a health insurance component with micro-
finance lending. But no one seemed to demand insurance, even people for whom there was 
clearly value. A substantial fraction of clients preferred to let go of microfinance rather than pay 
a moderately higher interest rate and keep their loan, highlighting that adverse selection was a 
moot concern in this setting. The study was somewhat confounded by the financial trouble SKS 
                                                 
13 McCord compares schemes for Cambodia, India, Tanzania and Uganda. 
14 Ito and Kono (2010) explain low take up of such schemes in India in terms of behavioral factors such as present 
bias. 
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got into by time that the final survey was done. In a related study, Islam and Maitra (2012) 
highlighted the health insurance effect of general microcredit. Using a large panel data set from 
rural Bangladesh, they found that households that had access to microcredit did not need to sell 
livestock in order to insure their consumption, when confronted with health shocks that required 
unexpected expenditures or led to lost income. 
Health care is a credence good, relying on trust concerning provider quality. In such cases, 
referrals through social networks can be very important. These issues are compounded when new 
health insurance products involve using new or untrusted providers – say a private doctor versus 
a government doctor. Two recent studies examine aspects of these social network effects in the 
context of health insurance in India. Berg et al. (2012) study how incentive pay and social 
distance interact in the process of disseminating information about India’s RSBY public health 
insurance program, using a large-scale RCT conducted in South India. This involved hiring local 
agents to disseminate information about the insurance program. These agents were paid either a 
flat fee or a variable rate that depended on the subsequently measured level of knowledge about 
the program in the eligible population. Incentive pay improved knowledge transmission to 
households that were socially distant from the agent, but not to socially similar households. 
Debnath and Jain (2015) examined the role of caste networks, within villages and urban wards, 
in affecting utilization of Aarogyasri, Andhra Pradesh’s state-level publicly financed health 
insurance program. The authors hypothesized that local caste networks could play a vital role in 
transmitting various kinds of information about the program and the available health care 
providers, as well as signaling that using formal healthcare through the program was socially 
acceptable or appropriate. Using administrative data on program claims the study estimated that 
a unit increase in Aarogyasri use and associated claim amounts in the same caste and village 
increased first-time claims in the same group. However, the behavior of other castes inside or 
outside the village, or same-caste peers outside the village in the same sub-district, had no 
significant effect on program utilization. 
 
Payments Technologies 
Because the poor face high transaction costs, even when using cash (when trying to save, cash 
may not be a convenient or safe store of value), reducing such costs through technological 
innovations can foster inclusion. There is robust evidence that digital payments technologies 
have positive impacts. Much of this evidence comes from the M-PESA scheme in Kenya (Jack, 
Ray and Suri, 2013; Jack and Suri, 2014): users are able to make more frequent and longer 
distance money transfers, and manage income variability better for smoother consumption 
patterns. In Kenya, the existence of a dominant telecom provider helped, although technological 
limitations in interoperability reduced access for some and stifled competition (Kendall et al., 
2011). In Tanzania (where M-PESA is also available), an interoperability agreement among 
several providers achieved widespread coverage (Bourreau and Valletti, 2015). In other 
countries, telecom companies have provided specific digital services: for example, Orange 
Money (Jordan), enables consumers to pay bills and to make point-of-sale purchases; Smart 
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Money (Philippines) and Regalli (Dominican Republic) enable customers to make bill payments. 
There are complex issues of infrastructure, regulatory policies, and even details of user interface 
design that can affect the success of digital financial services (Mas and Morawczynski, 2009; 
Medhi et al., 2009). 
In India, digital payments have been conceptualized as one component of a three-part strategy 
for financial inclusion using digital technologies: JAM, introduced earlier. Biometric identity 
cards in India (Aadhaar) have reduced corruption in welfare programs, economized on 
expenditures and even had some positive impacts on outcomes (Banerjee et al., 2016; 
Muralidharan et al., 2016; Imbert and Papp (2015). Other examples of positive impacts from 
using digital technologies include Afghanistan (Callen et al., 2015) and Nigeria (Aker et al., 
2014), suggesting that there are replicable opportunities for successful innovations. In India, the 
JAM framework for policy innovation has the potential to avoid a common problem in 
policymaking in that country, of broad and shallow interventions, although Ravi and Gakhar 
(2015) argue for breadth of financial services tied to digital innovation, to take advantage of 
economies of scope, given the fixed costs of infrastructure and adoption.15 
 
Financial Literacy 
On the demand side, financial literacy is an important factor in shaping financial inclusion. 
Consumers have to understand the nature of the products and services they are buying, as well as 
the implications of these purchases for their welfare. This may be relatively simple in the case of 
payments and transfers, but even bank accounts can present challenges in terms of weighing 
consumption and saving tradeoffs. Insurance products are inherently complicated by the 
difficulties of measuring uncertainty and evaluating risk.  
Lusardi and Mitchell (2014) survey issues surrounding financial literacy, although their 
empirical evidence is from industrial countries, which also face challenges of educating 
consumers of financial services. In all countries, one basic problem is lack of information (Gine 
et al., 2014, for Mexico), but how information asymmetries are overcome can be crucial (Alan et 
al., 2015, for Turkey). Miller et al. (2014) surveyed evaluations of 188 financial education 
programs, and found weak evidence for positive impacts on financial knowledge, let alone 
decision-making. However, it appears that teaching simplified guidelines for behavior as rules-
of-thumb can have a positive impact (Drexler et al., 2014).  
Financial literacy can have different dimensions and contexts, and several studies focus on 
specific aspects, such as household saving or managing a business. Cole et al. (2011) used large 
field surveys in India and Indonesia and RCTs in Indonesia, to show that prices of financial 
services have an effect on demand. However, though financial literacy was an important 
                                                 
15 Digital credit is showing some promise for financial inclusion in countries such as India. Creditworthiness does 
not have to be dependent on scanty financial history, but can be based on richer mobile phone usage history. Mobile 
phone usage can predict loan repayment (Björkegren & Grissen, 2015). Furthermore, as in the case of microfinance, 
dynamic incentives (larger loans at better terms) encourage repayment of digital loans. I am grateful to Eilin Francis 
for these points. 
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correlate of using financial services, financial training was not effective or cost efficient for 
promoting the use of bank accounts. In a business context, De Mel et al. (2014) conducted an 
RCT among low-income women in urban Sri Lanka to measure the impact of a commonly used 
business training course. They tried two treatments – training only and training plus a cash grant 
– over two years. Training alone changed business practices but had no impact on business 
profits, sales or capital stock. The grant plus training combination increased business profitability 
in the first eight months but this impact also dissipated in the second year. However, there was 
some evidence that training might be more effective for new owners. Karlan and Valdivia (2011) 
conducted an RCT in Peru to measure marginal impact of adding business training to a Peruvian 
group lending program (MFI) for female micro-entrepreneurs. Training had no effect on business 
revenue, profits, or employment, but there were business knowledge improvements among the 
entrepreneurs, and increased client retention rates for the MFI. 
Halan and Sane (2017) evaluated the effectiveness of information disclosure in the context of the 
insurance market in India, focusing on a specific life insurance product. They presented product 
advertisements to customers with four different sets of disclosures: basic information, the actual 
rate of return on the product in addition to the first set, a benchmark return of a similar product in 
addition to the second set, and product features of a more cost-effective alternative life insurance 
product in addition to the third set. Participants in each case were asked to provide assessments 
of the product and hypothetical purchase decisions. The results suggest that consumers may lose 
focus with “too much” information, and that information is more likely to be valuable if 
understandable in the context of prior financial literacy, highlighting the complexity of making 
financial innovation work to the benefit of inexperienced consumers.   
 
Behavioral Factors 
Because financial services involve complexities with respect to intertemporal tradeoffs and 
judgments about uncertainty and risk, they are most subject to what economists characterize as 
behavioral factors, namely, various (mostly systematic) deviations from the ideal of economic 
rationality. Some of these factors are hard to disentangle from lack of information, and financial 
literacy considerations overlap with behavioral factors. 
An important basic example of a behavioral bias is the difficulty that individuals have in 
committing to a savings strategy that they realize will be optimal for them over time. Ashraf et 
al., (2006, 2010) tested commitment savings products in the Philippines, with lock-in periods or 
penalties for early withdrawal. Women who were offered an individually-held commitment 
savings account reported increased decision-making power, and durable goods purchases shifted 
towards “female-oriented” goods, such as kitchen appliances. Those who used the commitment 
devices had significantly higher savings. In Kenya, Dupas and Robinson (2013) tested a simple 
“Safe Box” that allowed users to save for preventive or emergency health, and this significantly 
increased achievement of health savings goals. In an experiment in Uganda, primary school 
students were offered a “softer” commitment device, (funds in the savings account were 
available for withdrawal but labeled as being “for education”): combined with a parental 
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outreach program this increased spending on school supplies and improved test scores (Karlan 
and Linden, 2016). 
Many other behavioral phenomena have been examined in the context of financial inclusion. For 
example, Duflo et al. (2011) showed that many farmers in Western Kenya failed to take 
advantage of apparently profitable fertilizer investments, apparently due to a combination of 
procrastination and new consumption opportunities, but they did invest in response to small, 
time-limited discounts on the cost of acquiring fertilizer, such as free delivery. Other studies 
(Beaman et al., 2014; Dupas and Robinson, 2014;, and Kremer, et al. 2015) show that various 
types of small business owners in Kenya make profit-reducing decisions with respect to keeping 
enough change, hours and days worked, and inventory management. A growing number of 
studies in this vein intersect with studies examining the design and impacts of microcredit 
schemes. Many of the studies for India discussed in earlier sections have behavioral components 
to their analysis. 
 
Lessons and Conclusions  
Financial inclusion is complex and multidimensional, and this paper has focused on 
decomposing financial inclusion into the provision of more specific financial services, and 
examining the empirical evidence for how well different components of financial inclusion can 
be accomplished, as well as the methods that might work in specific contexts. While the 
evidence for different countries and programs is variable and mixed, this survey suggests that 
well-designed and implemented research studies can provide clear answers for Indian contexts, 
for many aspects of financial inclusion. Therefore, careful empirical research can guide policy 
design in India for financial inclusion.  
Turning to more specific conclusions and lessons, we begin with the previous surveys discussed 
in the introduction. Karlan and Morduch (2009) emphasize the shift from postulating 
hypothetical improvements in financial access to concrete lessons from experiments, pilots and 
trials in actual field settings. Aggarwal and Klepper (2013) emphasize how government policy 
changes can relax existing constraints to financial inclusion, especially with respect to savings, 
payments and financial literacy. Karlan et al. (2016) emphasize the positive evidence for the 
benefits of savings products and digital payments, and generally view digital technology as 
opening up new possibilities for reducing transaction costs, information asymmetries and market 
distortions. They suggest that microcredit and insurance present greater challenges, as do social 
norms that can disadvantage women, in particular. They also highlight issues of scaling up 
(including for digital efforts), offering integrated or complementary services, and linking 
financial inclusion to end goals such as health and education. 
In India, much of recent policy making with respect to financial inclusion is broadly consistent 
with the direction supported by current research-based knowledge. For example, this includes 
government-led pushes to increases access to banking, insurance and digital payments. Cole et 
al. (2015) and Field et al. (2016) both, in very different contexts, highlight the importance of 
organizational innovations that improve incentives within the banking sector. This suggests that 
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simply expanding the number of bank accounts may not be an optimal policy. At the same time, 
organizational changes are delicate matters and need to be context specific.  
In areas such as microcredit and small firm finance, the studies by Field et al. (2013), Raj and 
Sen (2013) and Barboni (2016) suggest that there is still much to learn in the Indian context 
about the specifics of relaxing financing constraints for small entrepreneurs, ranging from 
microenterprises to more substantial small and even medium firms. Issues of contract design, 
monitoring and enforcement, and training do not seem to be completely understood in the Indian 
context. In some cases, there is more detailed evidence for other countries, but the transferability 
of those lessons to India – indeed, even to specific Indian states – needs to be tested. There is 
also an obvious connection to issues of how the Indian banking sector functions on the side of 
making loans, in addition to the savings opportunities it offers. This relates back to the point 
about integration of different aspects of financial inclusion noted by Karlan et al. (2016). 
Agricultural credit and farmers’ insurance are another example of the need for an integrated 
approach to financial inclusion initiatives. Gaurav et al. (2011) and Mobarak and Rosenzweig 
(2013) provide newer evidence for India on how to design agricultural insurance that is more 
inclusive and sustainable, including issues of promoting adoption and inclusion (such as 
extending it to agricultural laborers and not just farmers). However, given variations in 
agricultural conditions around a large country such as India, as well as differences in income 
levels, further research can solidify the design of appropriate insurance products, as well as 
examine their integration with access to agricultural credit, market access (Mitra et al., 2012 and 
Maitra et al., 2014) and productive investment.  
Health insurance is another area where Indian policymaking has been innovative in ways that 
seek to promote inclusion, and one where further expansion is planned. In this case, the potential 
link between financial inclusion and outcomes ought to be very direct, but the evidence is still 
being gathered. Studies by Berg et al. (2012) and Debnath and Jain (2015) represent useful 
investigations of the processes that drive acceptance and adoption of such innovations as health 
insurance, which are obvious preconditions for achieving inclusion and positive impacts on 
health outcomes. 
Finally, the size of India’s market and the diversity of areas of possible innovations in financial 
products and services, are strongly indicative of the need to conduct further studies of patterns of 
household financial behavior. Badarinza et al. (2017) is a good example of preliminary work on 
documenting these patterns, but much more needs to be done. Campbell et al. (2012) conducted a 
useful study of India’s mortgage market, and plans to expand low income housing will increase 
the need for further such studies that emphasize financial inclusion. Complementing the 
understanding of specific markets for financial products and services, a much better 
understanding of financial literacy and effective methods for imparting financial education to 
consumers and small entrepreneurs is required in the Indian context. The study by Halan and 
Sane (2017) represents just a small slice of what policymakers and financial sector providers 
need to know about the potential behavior of individuals as innovations are designed and 
implemented.  
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In all of these cases, collaborations and coordination between policymakers, practitioners and 
researchers can be vital in achieving financial inclusion in multiple dimensions, making sure that 
this is done efficiently, and connecting financial inclusion to positive outcomes in health, 
education, productivity and employment. 
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